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OPINION 
________________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
  Eric Greene appeals from the denial of his motion to 
vacate the final judgment entered against him in his habeas 
corpus challenge to the validity of his 1996 state court 
conviction on charges of second degree murder, robbery, and 
conspiracy to commit robbery.  At the core of this appeal is 
whether the failure to properly present to the state courts a 
claim that Greene’s direct appeal counsel was ineffective can 
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be excused on the ground that his postconviction counsel was 
ineffective in not pursuing the claim.  After this appeal was 
filed, the Supreme Court answered this question in the 
negative, holding that “a federal court [may not] hear a 
substantial, but procedurally defaulted, claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel when a prisoner’s state 
postconviction counsel provides ineffective assistance by 
failing to raise that claim.”  Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 
2065 (2017).  In light of Davila, we will affirm the District 
Court’s denial of Greene’s motion to vacate.  
 
I. 
  
 This is the second time Greene’s habeas proceeding has 
been before us.  See Greene v. Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 
2010), aff’d, 565 U.S. 34 (2011).  The underlying facts and 
procedural history are set out in great detail in our earlier 
opinion, id. at 87–93, and will not be restated here.  Instead, we 
will recite only those facts pertinent to the question of whether 
Greene is entitled to vacate the judgment against him in order 
to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
(the “IAAC claim”).   
 
 During Greene’s trial for murder, robbery, and 
conspiracy, the prosecution introduced the redacted 
confessions of two of Greene’s nontestifying codefendants.  
After a jury returned a guilty verdict, Greene filed an appeal to 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court, arguing that the trial court’s 
decision to admit the redacted confessions violated the rule 
announced in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).  
The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected this claim.  After 
initially granting Greene’s request for allowance of appeal, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court summarily dismissed the 
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allowance of appeal as improvidently granted.  Commonwealth 
v. Trice, 727 A.2d 1113 (Pa. 1999).1   
 
 Here, Greene contends that appellate counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance when he failed to advise Greene that he 
had the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States 
for a writ of certiorari following the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s summary dismissal of his appeal.  In the briefing 
presented to the Commonwealth’s High Court, Greene argued 
that Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998), decided after the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court had rejected Greene’s 
Confrontation Clause claim, entitled him to relief on his 
Confrontation Clause claim.2  Having dismissed Greene’s 
appeal as improvidently granted, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court did not opine on the strength of Greene’s Confrontation 
Clause claim in light of Gray.   
 
 Greene’s conviction became final on July 29, 1999, 
when the time for filing a certiorari petition expired.  In August 
of 1999, Greene, proceeding pro se, filed a petition under the 
                                              
 
1 Greene is also known as Jarmaine Trice.  For purposes 
of clarity, we will refer to the Appellant as Eric Greene. 
 
2  In Gray, the Supreme Court held that the 
Confrontation Clause bars the admission of a nontestifying 
codefendant’s redacted confession at trial if the redaction 
“replace[s] a proper name with an obvious blank . . . or 
similarly notif[ies] the jury that a name has been deleted . . . .”  
523 U.S. at 195.  This is the kind of redaction that was made in 
the confessions of Greene’s codefendants that were introduced 
at his trial. 
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Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 9541, et seq.  The attorney appointed to represent 
Greene in the PCRA proceeding filed a “No Merit Letter” 
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1998).  In fulfilling its obligation under Finley, the state 
trial court undertook an examination of the claims presented in 
Greene’s pro se PCRA petition.  The state trial court observed 
that Greene had asserted “several claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel,” but “[t]he majority of these claims . . . 
[were] not pled with the requisite specificity to allow review.”  
(App. 128.)  It then concluded that “the record reveals no 
claims of arguable merit that could be raised under the PCRA,” 
(id. at 131), and dismissed Greene’s petition. 
 Greene appealed the dismissal of his PCRA petition to 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court.  In affirming the dismissal, 
the Superior Court held that Greene’s claims of ineffective trial 
and appellate counsel were “deemed waived” by virtue of 
Greene’s failure to develop those claims “with any specificity.”  
(Id. at 117.)  On July 27, 2004, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court denied Greene’s petition for allowance of appeal.  
Commonwealth v. Trice, 857 A.2d 679 (Pa. 2004). 
 In November of 2004, Greene commenced this federal 
habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  
Included among the claims he presented were a Confrontation 
Clause claim based upon Gray and claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial, appellate, and PCRA counsel.   
 The Magistrate Judge assigned to Greene’s case issued 
a comprehensive Report and Recommendation that concluded 
by proposing that the habeas petition be dismissed, but that a 
certificate of appealability be issued “with respect to 
[Greene’s] Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause claim 
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concerning the redacted confessions of his codefendants . . . .” 
(App. 64.)  Pertinent to the matter now before us, the 
Magistrate Judge found that because the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court had concluded that Greene waived his ineffective 
assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims, they could not 
now be considered on federal habeas review, observing that 
Greene “has not argued that any cause and prejudice will 
excuse the default . . . .”  (Id.)  Greene did not object to the 
Report and Recommendation.  On April 2, 2007, the District 
Court adopted the Report and Recommendation, dismissed the 
habeas petition, and granted a certificate of appealability on the 
Confrontation Clause claim. 
 A divided panel of our Court rejected the Confrontation 
Clause claim and affirmed the dismissal of the habeas petition.  
See Palakovich, 606 F.3d at 106.  With respect to Greene’s 
reliance upon Gray, we held that “clearly established Federal 
law” must be determined as of the date of the last relevant state-
court decision, and not when the conviction became final.  Id.  
This meant that Gray, decided after the Superior Court ruling 
but before Greene’s conviction became final, could not be 
relied upon for purposes of determining whether the state court 
decision resulted from an unreasonable application of “clearly 
established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States.”3  Id. at 98 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(1)).   
                                              
3  Greene was tried jointly with several codefendants, 
including Naree Abudullah. In 2012, we assessed the 
applicability of Gray to the redacted confessions introduced at 
Greene’s trial in the context of Abdullah’s contention that he 
was entitled to habeas relief on the ground that the admission 
of the codefendants’ redacted confessions violated his 
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 The United States Supreme Court thereafter granted 
Greene’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Greene v. Fisher, 563 
U.S. 917 (2011).  On November 8, 2011, the Court 
                                              
Confrontation Clause rights.  See Abdullah v. Warden SCI 
Dallas, 498 F. App’x 122 (3d Cir. 2012).  Unlike Greene, 
Abdullah was able to rely upon Gray because his appeal to the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court was still pending when Gray was 
issued.  Thus, we were confronted with the question of whether 
the Superior Court’s rejection of Abdullah’s Confrontation 
Clause claim was the result of “an unreasonable application of 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), and that 
clearly established Federal law included Gray. In Abdullah’s 
case, we held that, although the admission of the “redacted 
confessions raise[d] legitimate constitutional concerns,” the 
additional, conflicting evidence introduced at trial “cast doubt 
upon the . . . assertion that [the] redacted confessions gave rise 
to an immediate inference that Abdullah was among the 
individuals” who took part in the robbery.  Id. at 133–34.  
Because Gray cautions that the admission of a redacted 
confession does not necessarily rise to the level of a 
Confrontation Clause violation if “the trial [record] indicates 
that there [were] more participants than the redacted 
confession ha[d] named[,]’” id. at 134 (quoting Gray, 523 U.S. 
at 195) (internal brackets omitted), we concluded that the 
“redacted confessions, considered in conjunction with the 
other evidence presented by the government, arguably 
prevented a direct inference of Abdullah’s guilt from the 
confessions.”  Id.  We thus held that Abdullah failed to 
establish that the “Superior Court’s decision to reject 
Abdullah’s confrontation claim constituted” an unreasonable 
application of clearly established Federal law.  Id.    
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unanimously affirmed our ruling. See Greene v. Fisher, 565 
U.S. 34 (2011).  Commenting on the fact that Greene could not 
obtain judicial review of his Confrontation Clause claim based 
upon Gray, Justice Scalia stated: 
We must observe that Greene’s 
predicament is an unusual one of 
his own creation.  Before applying 
for federal habeas, he missed two 
opportunities to obtain relief under 
Gray:  After the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court dismissed his 
appeal, he did not file a petition for 
writ of certiorari from this Court, 
which would almost certainly have 
produced a remand in light of the 
intervening Gray decision . . . . Nor 
did Greene assert his Gray claim in 
a petition for state postconviction 
relief. 
Id. at 41. 
 More than three years after the Supreme Court rejected 
Greene’s reliance upon Gray to challenge the validity of his 
1996 conviction, Greene, proceeding pro se, filed a motion 
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to vacate the District Court Judgment entered on 
April 2, 2007.4  Greene’s motion sought to resurrect his 
defaulted IAAC claim on the strength of the Supreme Court’s 
2012 decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012).  
                                              
4  Counsel thereafter entered an appearance on behalf of 
Greene and filed an amended Rule 60(b) motion. 
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Martinez held that “[w]here, under state law, claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an 
initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will 
not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim 
of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review 
collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that 
proceeding was ineffective.”  Id. at 17 (emphasis added).  The 
gist of Greene’s argument was that his direct appeal counsel 
was ineffective for not advising him of the availability of 
seeking Supreme Court review of his substantial Confrontation 
Clause claim based upon Gray; that his first opportunity to 
present this IAAC claim was at his initial PCRA proceeding; 
and that his PCRA counsel was ineffective for not having 
presented what Greene perceived to be a meritorious IAAC 
claim.  Greene maintained that the rationale underlying 
Martinez––that a convicted person should have one counseled 
opportunity to present an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim––applied in the appellate context, as well as the trial 
setting. 
 By Order dated August 26, 2016, the District Court 
denied Greene’s Rule 60 (b)(6) motion. In the course of a 
comprehensive Opinion accompanying the Order, the District 
Court summarized the following reasons for denying the 
Motion: 
First, [Greene’s] Motion 
constitutes an impermissible 
successive habeas petition.  
Second, Martinez . . . does not 
apply to [Greene’s] ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  
Finally, even if [Greene’s] Motion 
did not constitute an impermissible 
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successive habeas petition, and 
even if Martinez applied to provide 
“cause” for [Greene’s] procedural 
default, the equitable factors 
warranting consideration under 
Rule 60(b) do not weigh in 
[Greene’s] favor.5  
                                              
5 We have set forth five equitable factors that courts 
must consider in passing upon a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, Cox v. 
Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 116, 124–26 (3d Cir. 2014), each of which 
the District Court analyzed in great detail, including: (1) the 
timeliness of Greene’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion; (2) the merits 
underlying Greene’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim; 
(3) the amount of time that elapsed between Greene’s 
conviction and the commencement of habeas proceedings; (4) 
Greene’s diligence in pursuing review of his claims; and (5) 
the gravity of Greene’s sentence.  See (App. 20–28.)  Of these 
factors, the District Court found that the first, second, and 
fourth all weighed against granting relief, while the third and 
fifth factors were neutral and therefore did not support nor 
detract from Greene’s claim.  Id.   
 
Beyond the five Cox factors, the District Court 
considered the following two additional equitable factors: (1) 
Greene’s “aver[ment] that ‘state and federal court orders and 
opinions over the past decade have––rightly or wrongly––
protected institutional, procedural, and structural interests at 
the expense of [Greene’s] ability to litigate the Gray claim[;]” 
and (2) Greene’s “argu[ment] that irregularities in the trial and 
appellate process ‘detract from the confidence [the District] 
Court should have in the verdict.’”  Id. at 28–29.  The District 
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(App. 13.)  Concluding that “there may be room for debate on 
the issues” addressed in its Opinion, the District Court issued 
a certificate of appealability.  (Id. at 30)  This timely appeal 
followed.  
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 
and 2253.6  We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for 
                                              
Court concluded that, on balance, “the Cox factors . . . 
weigh[ed] heavily against relief and [Greene’s] additional 
proffered support [was] not enough to warrant 60(b) relief in 
this case.”  Id. at 29.   
 
6  Appellees argue here, as they did in the District Court, 
that we lack jurisdiction to consider Greene’s Rule 60(b) 
motion, claiming that it is an impermissible second or 
successive habeas petition because it seeks to raise a claim not 
previously presented in the initial habeas proceedings, i.e., 
Greene’s IAAC claim, and Greene did not receive this Court’s 
authorization to file a second habeas petition as required by 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).  The District Court agreed with 
Appellees.  Contrary to the District Court’s view, Greene’s 
Rule 60(b) motion, premised as it was upon Martinez, was not 
an impermissible second or successive habeas petition under 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”).  See Norris v. Brooks, 794 F.3d 401, 403 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (holding that petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion 
invoking Martinez was not a successive habeas petition 
“because it ‘merely asserted that a previous ruling which 
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abuse of discretion.  Cox, 757 F.3d at 118 (citing Brown v. 
Phila. Hous. Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003)).  “A 
district court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an erroneous 
conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact.”  
Id. (citing Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 1999)).   
III. 
Greene must demonstrate “extraordinary 
circumstances” to obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6).7  Cox, 757 
F.3d at 115.  The “extraordinary circumstance” claimed by 
Greene is the holding in Martinez, decided after the judgment 
in his habeas proceedings concluded, which allowed a claim of 
                                              
precluded a merits determination was in error’”) (quoting 
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 n.4 (2005)) (internal 
brackets omitted).  
 
7 “Rule 60(b) authorizes a district court to grant a party 
relief from judgment for various specific reasons, as well as 
‘any other reason that justifies relief.’”  Norris, 794 F.3d at 404 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)).  Under this catch-all 
provision, “[r]elief is appropriate . . . only in ‘extraordinary 
circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme and 
unexpected hardship would occur.’”  Id. (quoting Sawka v. 
Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1993)). “Such 
circumstances,” the Supreme Court has emphasized, “rarely 
occur in the habeas context,” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 
524, 535 (2005), and “[i]ntervening developments in the law 
by themselves rarely constitute the extraordinary 
circumstances required for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).” 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239 (1997). 
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ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel to serve as “cause” 
to allow an otherwise procedurally defaulted claim to be heard 
in federal court.    
Greene’s IAAC claim was not properly presented to the 
state courts, and is thus deemed to be procedurally defaulted 
for purposes of federal habeas corpus review.  “[A] federal 
court may not review federal claims that were procedurally 
defaulted in state court. . . .”  Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2064 
(internal citation omitted).  “A state prisoner may overcome the 
prohibition on reviewing procedurally defaulted claims if he 
can show ‘cause’ to excuse his failure to comply with the state 
procedural rule and ‘actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 
constitutional violation.’”  Id. at 2064–65 (quoting Wainwright 
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 
U.S. 722, 750 (1991)).8  “To establish ‘cause’—the element of 
the doctrine relevant in this case—the prisoner must ‘show that 
some objective factor external to the defense impeded 
counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.’”  
Id. (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).  
                                              
8 A federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, 
invoke the “fundamental miscarriage of justice exception” to 
review an otherwise procedurally defaulted claim.  McQuiggin 
v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 395 (2013).  This exception, 
however, is restricted “to a severely confined category[] of 
cases in which new evidence shows ‘it is more likely than not 
that no reasonable juror would have convicted the petitioner.’”  
Id.  (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995)) 
(internal brackets omitted).  Because Greene has not proffered 
evidence of actual innocence, the fundamental miscarriage of 
justice exception is accordingly not at play here.   
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Greene asserts that the ineffectiveness of his PCRA counsel 
qualifies as “cause” for the procedural default of his IAAC 
claim.   
At the time Greene’s habeas proceedings concluded 
with the Supreme Court’s ruling in 2011, it was well settled 
that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel could not 
qualify as “cause” to excuse a procedural default.  Coleman, 
501 U.S. at 755; see also Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 
522 n.16 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]here is no right to counsel for state 
post-conviction proceedings and, therefore, no claim of 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel may be 
made.”).  In Martinez, however, the Supreme Court carved out 
a “narrow exception” to Coleman’s general rule that allows 
federal habeas courts to review procedurally defaulted claims 
of trial counsel ineffectiveness if the applicable state law 
requires that those claims be “raised in an initial-review 
collateral proceeding,” rather than on direct appeal.  566 U.S. 
at 9, 17.  Specifically, in Martinez, the petitioner attempted to 
argue on direct appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective, but 
was prohibited from doing so because Arizona law required 
such claims to be raised in a separate collateral proceeding.  Id. 
at 6.  Postconviction counsel subsequently failed to raise an 
ineffective-assistance claim during the collateral proceeding, 
thus causing a procedural default of the claim.  Id.  Had 
Coleman applied, counsel’s failure in this regard would not 
have “excuse[d] the procedural default” of petitioner’s 
ineffective-assistance claim because, under Coleman, “an 
attorney’s errors in a postconviction proceeding do not qualify 
as cause for a default.”  Id. at 7–8 (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 
754–55).  In Martinez, the Court crafted an exception to this 
rule by holding that, in such a situation––i.e., where state law 
prohibits convicted persons from alleging ineffective 
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assistance of trial counsel on direct review––“a procedural 
default will not bar a federal habeas court” from hearing the 
petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim if the 
default is due to the subsequent ineffectiveness of 
postconviction counsel during the collateral proceeding.  Id. at 
17.   
In his Rule 60(b)(6) motion, Greene relied upon 
Martinez to argue that PCRA counsel’s failure to assert a claim 
of appellate counsel ineffectiveness constituted an 
“extraordinary circumstance” so as to warrant Rule 60(b)(6) 
relief.  (Appellant’s Br. at 37.)   As support, Greene pointed to 
our decision in Cox, where we held that “Martinez, without 
more, does not entitle a habeas petitioner to Rule 60(b)(6) 
relief[,]” but that Martinez could support such a motion if other 
equitable considerations are present.  757 F.3d at 124–26.  
Greene’s reliance upon Martinez, however, is now 
foreclosed by Davila.  There, the petitioner asked the Supreme 
Court to do precisely what Greene is asking us to do here, 
namely: “extend Martinez to allow a federal court to hear a 
substantial, but procedurally defaulted, claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel when a prisoner’s state 
postconviction counsel provides ineffective assistance by 
failing to raise that claim.”  Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2065.  In 
declining to extend Martinez to claims of appellate counsel 
ineffectiveness, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he Court 
in Martinez made clear that it exercised its equitable discretion 
in view of the unique importance of protecting a defendant’s    
. . . right to effective assistance of trial counsel.”  Id. at 2066 
(emphasis added).  “[C]laims of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel,” the Court opined, “necessarily must be 
heard in collateral proceedings, where counsel is not 
constitutionally guaranteed.”  Id. at 2068 (emphasis in 
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original).  An ineffective counsel claim may be presented only 
where counsel is constitutionally guaranteed.  Wainwright v. 
Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587–88 (1982) (holding that where there 
is no constitutional right to counsel, there can be no deprivation 
of effective assistance).  Thus, Greene does not have a claim 
for ineffective assistance of his PCRA counsel in relation to his 
IAAC claim.  Accordingly, Davila compels the conclusion that 
Greene cannot demonstrate “cause” to excuse the procedural 
default of his IAAC claim.       
Thus, the state of the law with respect to Greene’s 
procedural default of his IAAC claim remains the same today 
as when the default occurred: alleged ineffectiveness of PCRA 
counsel cannot overcome the consequence of the failure to 
present the IAAC claim to the state courts in the first instance.  
See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755.  Because the law remains 
unchanged as to Greene, he cannot demonstrate the requisite 
“extraordinary circumstances” to warrant setting aside the 
District Court’s judgment in this case.  Thus, the District Court 
correctly concluded in holding that Martinez did not afford 
Greene a right to relief here.9 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District  
                                              
9 In light of our decision that Davila compels rejection 
of Greene’s reliance upon the alleged ineffectiveness of his 
PCRA counsel as “cause” for the procedural default of his 
IAAC claim, there is no need to address the District Court’s 
consideration of the equitable factors governing Rule 60(b)(6) 
motions. 
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Court’s August 29, 2016, denial of Greene’s Rule 60(b) 
motion.   
